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care fraud as the government's second highest priorver
sinceviolent
the U.S.
Attorney
General named
health
ity after
crime,
the government
has cracked
down on health care fraud and abuse.' Some of this crackdown has been needed. 2 The General Accounting Office
(GAO) estimates that as much as 10 percent of all government expenditures on health care are being siphoned out
of the system because of fraud or abuse.3
The extreme measures taken to curb health care abuse
have raised eyebrows, however. 4 The American Medical
Association and the American Hospital Association both
have been vocal in their disapproval, describing the current
enforcement initiative as "absolutely out of control."' The
associations even went so far as to file suit to enjoin the government's actions."
Legislators also appear to question the government's
tactics. 7 Bills have been introduced in both the U.S. House
of Representatives and the Senate to revise the Civil False
Claims Act (FCA) to protect health care providers better
from being sued for simple billing errors.' Both bills would
create a safe harbor for providers that are in substantial
compliance with a model compliance plan and would require the government to prove its cases by "clear and convincing evidence." 9 The House's proposed Health Care
Claims Guidance Act would also institute a safe harbor for
providers that relied on erroneous information provided
by a federal agency and limit liability to cases in which the
government alleges a material amount of damages.) The
Senate's version would cap penalties and offer a safe harbor for claims submitted based on a fiscal intermediary."
The Department of Justice (DOJ) and Office of the Inspector General (OIG) are strongly opposed to both bills.
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Courts also express dissatisfaction with the government's methods. The U.S. Supreme Court characterized the
fines imposed on one health care provider as grossly disproportionate. 12 In another case, an appellate court chastised the government for its relentless pursuit of astronomical, unpayable fines. 13 In yet another case, a federal district
court described the government's tactics as heavy-handed
and probably wrong. 14 Few health care claims are actually
litigated under the FCA because of the high stakes.'" In many
of the cases that have been litigated, courts have decried
the current enforcement scheme. 6
DOJ and OIG admit that some providers' concerns
are legitimate. 7 To ensure that future health care investigations proceed in a fair manner, both DOJ and OIG have
issued new enforcement guidelines to their staffs." They
have also launched new compliance initiatives. 9 For example, OIG has published multiple, sector-specific model
compliance plans and a provider self-disclosure protocol
summary. 20 These new initiatives are aimed at helping providers achieve compliance rather than punishing noncompliance.
Although the investigative environment appears to have
improved somewhat in response to these changes, evidence
indicates that inappropriate and overzealous enforcement
remains a problem.2' GAO's August 1999 report on DOJ's
use of the FCA indicates that abusive practices, while diminished, continue to linger particularly in the laboratory
unbundling initiative. 22 As a result, some providers continue
to seek enforceable legal protection. 23 The best protection
would be to pass the legislation currently proposed by Congress, but this solution may prove impossible, at least for
the present. 24 Hence, I explore another alternative-the
protection provided by the U.S. Constitution.
Under the Constitution, the government's current use
of the FCA poses two potential problems. First, health care
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providers lack criminal procedural protections when facing civil penalties that can total millions of dollars and administrative sanctions that can include exclusion from all
government programs. 2s Second, some of the civil fines
imposed appear grossly disproportionate both to the health
care provider's offense and to the damages suffered by the
26
government.
The Supreme Court has attempted to remedy the lack
of procedural protections for large civil penalties in the
past. 27 Concerned that Congress, by imposing such large
fines to deter quasi-criminal conduct, was doing an endrun around important procedural protections, the Court
required that defendants be given criminal procedural protections when defending against civil statutes that were "punitive" or "criminal in nature." 2 Recently, however, it has
29
all but abandoned this attempt as unworkable.
Although turning away from providing additional procedural protections, the Supreme Court may have started
down the path to a better solution. Today, it appears poised
to monitor the substantive result of large civil fines under
the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause.30 I trace
the Supreme Court's path, evaluate it, and explain how
providers may be able to use the Excessive Fines Clause to
reduce fines under the FCA. 3' Although I only address the
FCA, the analysis is also applicable to fines imposed against
health care providers under the Civil Monetary Penalties
Law and the Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act. 2
Section one illustrates how a lack of adequate procedural protections, an irrational fine computation mechanism, and misplaced incentives sometime combine to produce excessive fines against health care providers. Section
two explores how the Supreme Court has wrestled with
the idea of applying criminal procedural protections to civil
statutes that impose large monetary fines and evaluates this
approach. Section three analyzes the Court's latest solution, a substantive review of fines. In particular, I describe
the decision in United States v. Bajakajian, illustrate how
providers can use that decision to argue for a reduction of
fines under the FCA, and assess the strengths and weaknesses of substantive review. Finally, in section four, I appraise increased procedural protections and substantive review as a cure for the constitutional infirmity of some large
civil fines. I also offer, but ultimately reject, a different judicial solution.
Although readers may disagree that the FCAs per claim
fine is not sufficiently tailored to culpability or damages,
my goal is to urge that some of the energy spent fighting
fraud and abuse be redirected to helping providers achieve
compliance. In fact, the government has already begun
moving in this direction on its own.

Potential problems with the FCAs application to
health care providers

Background
The government seems to favor the FCA in its battle against
health care fraud for two reasons. First, monetary penalties
under the FCA frequently reach into tens of millions of
dollars. 3 Second, liability is relatively easy to obtain. Under the FCA, health care providers who knowingly make
false or fraudulent claims to the government are fined
$5,000 to $10,000 per claim in addition to treble damages.34 This can result in huge fines because some health
care providers routinely submit thousands of claims to the
3
government each year. 1
What is more, under the FCA, providers enjoy few
procedural protections. In a typical scenario, health care
providers being investigated for fraud confront parallel
criminal, civil, and administrative proceedings. 6 They face
imprisonment and fines under criminal law, more large fines
under civil law, and exclusion from further participation in
government health care programs under administrative law.
Throughout the civil and administrative proceedings, providers lack criminal procedural protections. They are forced
to turn over documents and to testify to incriminating evidence.37 Moreover, they are not protected from further civil
or administrative proceedings if criminally convicted, and
the government only has to prove its civil case against them
by a preponderance of the evidence.The FCA's relatively low scienter requirement exacerbates this lack of procedural protections. A provider can be
found liable even though it had no actual knowledge that
the claim submitted was false.3" The statute only requires
deliberate ignorance or reckless disregard for the truth or
falsity of the claim. 39 Further, providers have an affirmative
obligation to ensure that their billing is correctly submitted. 40 They face liability even if they did not prepare the
41
bills themselves or acted at the direction of a consultant.
This burden can be staggering given the voluminous, often
42
ambiguous health care regulations.
Although most cases that the government has pursued
involve intentional conduct or gross lack of supervision (that
is, legitimate, fraudulent activity), not all do. The recent
trend toward national enforcement initiatives is particularly troubling, because these initiatives focus on commonly
misunderstood regulations that have been misinterpreted
throughout the health care industry for years without government complaint. 43 More troubling still, DOJ officials
sometimes target the largest institutions with the most claims
and the deepest pockets, even though these highly respected
institutions had no intent to defraud the government." The
current case law does not reflect this problem because these
institutions invariably settle even nonmeritorious
claims to
4
avoid potential liability of millions of dollars. 1
Although the new DOJ-OIG guidelines seek to combat these problems, the FCA creates a strong financial incentive for enforcement. 46 Nationally, DOJ and OIG receive praise based on the amount of money returned to the
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Arbitrary fine computation

Not proportional to damages
Fines under the FCA do not seefi to correlate to damages
in any straightforward way. A provider that submits numerous claims may cause the government significantly less
harm than a provider that files a single false claim. Nevertheless, the provider that submits more claims in all likelihood will face a significantly higher fine as a result of the
per claim charge. For example, by filing 500 false claims, a
provider may cost the government $1,000. That provider,
however, would be liable for $3,000 in treble damages, but
$2.5 to $5 million in per claim charges. Meanwhile, another provider that makes one false claim for $100,000 is
liable for $300,000 in treble damages, but only $5,000 to
$10,000 in per offense charges. Thus, the provider that
costs the government $1,000 in false claims ends up paying
over $2.5 million in fines, while the provider that costs the
government $100,000 in false claims pays only slightly over
$300,000 in fines. In other words, a single claim offender
could cost the government 100 times more money yet pay
ten times less.5 3 These results indicate that penalties under
the FCA are often not proportional to damages.
Not only are per offense charges not proportional to
damages, but also there is no evidence that the number of
false claims increases government expenses. If it were possible to prove that each fraudulent claim imposed additional
costs, these damages could be addressed directly through
the imposition of treble damages. The only remedial justification for adding a per claim fine (instead of relying on
treble damages) would be if each fraudulent claim cost the
government money in some way that was difficult to detect
or prove.5 4 In fact, the opposite seems true. The most difficult-to-prove costs associated with health care fraud are
caused by monitoring and enforcement. Prolifi&small gauge
offenders may be easier to catch through monitoring, because
they make more false claims." Similarly, the government
may have an easier time proving liability when there is more
than one offense; this is because multiple offenses make the
"knowledge" element of the FCA easier to establish.

Application of the FCA to health care providers can often
result in disproportionate fines that bear little relation to
culpability or actual damages. Two factors come together
to produce this result. First, the FCA uses a per claim fine
as well as treble damages to compute liability.5 By itself,
this characteristic is not necessarily offensive. The per claim
fine was included to ensure that the full cost of false claims
was captured and to penalize the act of making a false claim.
This penalty may not be particularly well tailored, but it
provides rough remedial justice in most cases.5 2 Unfortunately, health care providers present a relatively unique case.
They routinely submit thousands of claims to the government annually. When numerous small claims are at issue,
the FC.s per claim fines can metamorphize from rough
remedial justice to grossly disproportionate penalties. The
examples below illustrate how this can occur.

Not proportional to culpability
The per offense charge also appears to bear little rational
relation to culpability. s6 The health care provider that defrauds the government of a small amount of money on many
occasions is not per se more culpable than a provider that
defrauds the government of a large sum of money once.
The argument that providers that file numerous false claims
are more culpable than those that file only one fails. A prolific small gauge offender might be less guilty in many different ways. First, the prolific small gauge offender might
have acted recklessly whereas the single claim offender acted
with specific intent to defraud. Second, the prolific offender
may be liable because it failed to monitor adequately its
employees or a third-party billing contractor, while the single

federal government. Congress's recent concern with overaggressive enforcement should mitigate any misplaced incentives at the national level, but financial incentives remain a problem at the local level. To make a name for themselves, local officials sometimes pursue claims that do not
fall within the DOJ-OIG enforcement guidelines.47 Qui tam
plaintiffs add to this problem. Even if the government only
pursues cases that fall within the guidelines, the text of the
FCA allows liability in a much greater range of cases. Qui
tam plaintiffs can seek recovery in any case that meets the
minimal requirements of the FCA. 48 The government has
an incentive to join in these cases, but, even if it chooses not
to, providers face enormous potential liability. By 1997,
judgments in qui tam cases topped $625 million.4 9 Given
the new advertising campaign by the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) to encourage more people to
come forward and to report fraud and abuse, this number
will likely continue to increase.
A combination of the threat of inordinate liability under the FCA and the possibility that the government will
impose the "death penalty"-exclusion from all state and
federal programs--causes most providers to seek settlement
even if they view it as little more than extortion. 0 The cases
that have been litigated show that this bombardment of
large penalties, without criminal procedural protections,
causes many courts to question the current system for combating health care fraud. Although courts have expressed a
variety of concerns, I focus specifically on how per claim
penalties can result in disproportionate fines. This potential constitutional infirmity still derives in part, however,
from the totality of the circumstances. Large fines, even if
disproportionate, would be less troubling if providers enjoyed criminal procedural protections or if the FCA required
that providers act with specific intent to defraud the government.
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claim offender acted personally. Third, the prolific offender
might have detrimentally relied on a consultant's or government official's billing advice, while the single claim offender interpreted the regulation itself. Finally, the prolific
small gauge offender might have cost the government significantly less money than the single claim offender.
The FCA attempts to account for greater culpability by
allowing judges to impose fines of $10,000 per offense rather
than $5,000 when appropriate. But this judicial discretion
is a poor remedy for the problem for prolific offenders.
Reconsider the scenario described above. The prolific small
gauge offender that filed 500 claims paid over $2.5 million
even if it was only assessed the $5,000 per offense fine.
This provider might be liable only because of recklessness
for acts by its employees or its billing contractor. The single
claim offender that costs the government 100 times as much
money pays a fine of only $310,000 even if it acted personally, with the specific intent to defraud the government,
and the highest per offense charge is applied. As this example illustrates, the prolific small gauge offender's fine
bears little rational relation to culpability.
Even if a prolific small gauge offender and a single claim
offender both act personally, with specific intent, and cost
the government the same amount of money, the small gauge
offender would still face disproportionate liability. Returning to my example, assume now that the prolific small gauge
offender and the single claim offender both cost the government $100,000; both acted personally and with specific intent. Some would argue that, all things being equal,
the provider that filed multiple false claims acted with greater
culpability because its conduct demonstrates a pattern of
behavior or because it repeatedly chose to defraud the government. This argument makes a deontological assumption;
but even if the basic premise is correct, the results under the
FCA are still troubling. The prolific small gauge offender
still faces liability of over $2.8 million whereas the single
claim offender faces a fine of $310,000. Whatever increased
culpability might be attributed to having filed several claims,
it does not equate to a difference in fines 7 of $2.5 million
(assuming the lowest per offense charge),.
The FCA miscounts
The FCAs per claim charge has another problem matching
liability to culpability: it miscounts. Under the FCA, each
application of a single misinterpretation triggers the per
claim penalty. If a health care provider misunderstands a
Medicare regulation, it will follow that interpretation in all
cases. Although this course leads to numerous false claims,
the provider only has made one mistake recklessly, misinterpreting one regulation."8
Prolific small gauge offenders are particularly vulnerable to the FCAs weaknesses. Many times, the largest part of the penalty is the mandatory per offense charge. Although

judges might believe that the fines are excessive, most courts
have held that the minimum per offense charge is mandatory under the text of the FCA. s9 Hence, the more small
false claims a- provider submits, the greater the disparity
between the harm caused and the penalty imposed.
Past attempts at procedural solutions
The Kennedy-Ward test: criminalv. civil
Initially, the Supreme Court sought to control excessive fines
by providing criminal procedural protections. This required
determining when sanctions imposed by civil statutes rose
to the level at which additional procedural protections were
required. The Court approached this classification problem by categorizing otherwise civil statutes as "criminal in
nature" when they warranted added procedural protections. 60 In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, the Supreme
Court found two sections of the 1952 Immigration and
Nationality Act unconstitutional because the Act was criminal in nature but failed to provide the procedural safeguards
constitutionally required for criminal prosecution. 6' The
Court presented a multifactor test to determine when a statute was criminal in nature, stating that "absent conclusive
evidence of the congressional intent ... these factors must
be considered in relation to the statute on its face. '62 The

test listed seven factors:
[(1)] "whether the sanction involved an affirmative
disability or restraint,
(2) whether it had historically been regarded as a punishment,
(3) whether it comes into play only on a finding of
scienter,
(4) whether its operation will promote the traditional
aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence,
(5) whether the behavior to which it applies is already
a crime,
(6) whether an alternative purpose to which it may
rationally be connected is assignable to it, and
(7) whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned. 3
Almost twenty years later, the Court revised the test in
United States v. Ward. 4 Concerned that the standard in
Kennedy was too ambiguous and difficult to administer
without providing criminal procedural protections to a vast
array of civil cases, the Court narrowed the test. In Ward, it
upheld a monetary penalty imposed under the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, stating that the Act was civil in nature and therefore did not violate the defendant's right
against self-incrimination. 61 In reaching its decision, the
Court focused on the fact that Congress had intentionally66
separated civil and criminal penalties in the same statute.
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The Court stated that the congressional classification of a
penalty as civil would not be set aside without the "clearest
proof" that the penalty in question was "punitive in either
purpose or effect." 67 This dicta raised the level of proof
required by the Kennedy test.
The Kennedy-Ward test fails to resolve the excessive
fine problem that plagues health care providers that submit
numerous claims to the government, because the FCA almost certainly would not be considered criminal in nature.6"
After all, the legislature intentionally separated the Civil
69
False Claims Act (FCA) from the Criminal False Claims Act.
Under Ward, this separation demonstrates legislative intent
that the FCA be treated as a civil statute. 70 Once the court
establishes that the legislature intended a statute to be civil,
courts apply criminal procedural protections only when a
statute contains the "clearest proof" that the penalty in
question is punitive on its face.7 1 This high standard makes
surmounting legislative intent impossible in practice and
effectively guts whatever protection the Kennedy test once
provided.
Halper: punitive v. remedial
Realizing that the Kennedy-Ward test failed to capture statutes like the FCA, which can be criminal as applied, if not
on their face, the Supreme Court tried a new approach in
United States v. Halper.72 In Halper, the Court began by
asking whether the penalty imposed served a punitive or
remedial purpose. 73 This inquiry bypassed the threshold
question presented by the Kennedy-Ward test-whether a
statute was criminal or civil in nature. It also switched the
inquiry from the nature of the statute on its face to the
purpose of the statute as applied, thereby requiring a caseby-case analysis.
In Halper, the Supreme Court held that the government could not bring a claim under the FCA against Irwin
Halper who filed sixty-five inflated Medicare claims after74
the government had already criminally prosecuted him.
The Court reasoned that the FCA serves a punitive purpose, and because Halper had already faced one punishment in court, it would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause
75
to subject him to a second punishment for the same acts.
In deciding that the statute served a punitive purpose, the
Court considered the fact that Halper faced potential civil
liability of over $130,000 for inflated charges that cost the
government less than $600.76 The Court found the disparity between the government's expenses and the defendant's
potential liability so great that it held that the sanction bore
no rational relation to compensating the government
but
77
rather served as an additional punishment.
Halper'spunitive versus remedial test afforded prolific
offenders with some protection from excessive fines. By
being granted criminal procedural rights, prolific small gauge
offenders gained protection from double jeopardy and self-

incrimination. These protections consolidated sanctions,
but, for several reasons, Halperstill failed to provide sufficient protection from excessive fines.
7
First, Halper failed to produce a reliable precedent.
Courts proved unable to differentiate statutes that required
additional procedural protection from those that did not,
based on the punitive versus remedial distinction.7 ' Thus,
Halper produced a judicial quagmire rather than a clear
precedent.8 0 Without real guidelines on how to apply the
distinction in a sensible manner, many courts continued to
rely on the Kennedy-Ward test.
Second, the criminal procedural protections provided
by Halpercannot prevent excessive fines. Even with procedural protections, judges remained compelled by the mandatory nature of the FCACs per offense charge to impose
arguably disproportionate penalties on prolific offenders.8 '
Criminal procedural protections cannot change this. The
Double Jeopardy Clause at issue in Halper does not monitor the amount of a fine; it only monitors a fine imposed
after criminal punishment. The Double Jeopardy Clause
does not protect prolific offenders from excessive liability
or even multiple sanctions. It only ensures that the government imposes all sanctions at the same time. If procedural
protections cannot change the ultimate result, they offer
little solace to providers that suffer excessive liability under
the FCA.
The impact of proceduralprotections: an analogy to
criminal law
Nevertheless, the question remains whether lack of proportionality between an offense and its punishment necessarily creates a constitutional infirmity. After all, the judicial system refuses to perform ex post proportionality review o f criminal punishments unless they violate the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment in the Eighth
Amendment. 2 Courts have read this prohibition so narrowly that, in practice, criminal sentences are never reviewed. 3 Perhaps, therefore, there is no reason to review
civil fines.
After all, criminal sentences have several characteristics in common with fines under the FCA. The legislature
sets both punishments prospectively, offering some protection against unfair results because the penalties are set without any knowledge of to whom they will apply. This prospective setting also enables legislators plenty of time to
research and debate the proper level for the sanction and
to revise it if they change their minds. Despite these protections, the punishments that result from the criminal justice
system, like the punishments from fines applied to prolific
offenders, are often not "fair" because district attorneys
can charge-stack. Like the counting problem under the FCA,
prosecutors often manipulate the definition of crimes so
that conduct violates several statutes. Therefore, criminal
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punishments frequently do not correspond to the gravity
of the offense, yet courts have not 8been
willing to review
4
disproportionate criminal sentences.
Criminal punishment is different, however. First, defendants enjoy procedural protections on the front end,
like the right against self-incrimination and double jeopardy, and a heightened burden of proof. Second, criminal
sentences are more narrowly tailored than penalties under the
FCA.85 These protections already curb prosecutorial abuse.
Individuals charged with fines receive no such protections.
Providing criminal protections, even if an inadequate
solution to excessive fines, may be sufficient to satisfy any
constitutional obligation. Ultimately, the solution in Halper
failed because the Court found the distinction between
punitive and remedial statutes impossible to administer. As
the Court eventually admitted, almost all civil statutes serve
at least some punitive purpose.8 6 As such, a punitive purpose test is so grossly overinclusive that it becomes virtually
meaningless.8 7 A punitive purpose test requires criminal
procedural protections for almost all civil statutes, a result
far too costly to implement. Criminal protections cost taxpayers an enormous amount of money, require greater judicial resources, and often impede punishment on technical grounds. Although these additional expenses might be
merited when personal liberty is at stake, few people would
like to see the same resources devoted to every individual
who faces a fine. Unable to arrive at a sensible test to distinguish which punitive statutes merited protection, the court
abandoned the attempt to evaluate statutes as applied.
Hudson: a return to the Kennedy-Ward test
Displeased with the doctrinal difficulties that resulted from
Halper, the Supreme Court emphasized that Halper presented a rare case and that the holding was extremely narrow.8 In December 1997, the Court in large part disavowed
the analytical method of Halper and returned to the civil
versus criminal distinction of the Kennedy-Ward test. 9 In
Hudson v. United States, the court looked at the legislative
intent on the face of the statute to determine if Congress
had intended the statute to be civil.9 0 When it found that
Congress had so intended, the Court held that only the
"clearest proof" that the sanctions were substantively criminal would cause the Court to demand procedural protections.9" Although the statute at issue penalized behavior that
was also criminal and served a deterrent purpose, the Court
held that these facts did not render the statute criminal,2
and so, the Double Jeopardy Clause had not been violated.
While opting to revert to the Kennedy-Ward test, the
Court pointed out that other constitutional provisions address many of the ills at which the Halper decision was
directed, 93 specifically, the Due Process, Equal Protection,
and Excessive Fines Clauses. 94 Each of these provisions addresses substantive results. By refocusing its attention on

substantive provisions of the Constitution, the Court implied that ex post substantive review is necessary to cure
disproportionate fines. In Hudson, the Court appears to
abandon the attempt to control excessive fines through ex
ante procedural protections. 9"
Within months of this statement, the Court issued
Bajakajian, finding a statute unconstitutional as applied
under the Excessive Fines Clause.9 6 Bajakajian represents
the Court's first attempt to resolve disproportionate fines
by monitoring substantive results rather than by providing
procedural protections.

Bajakajian: cx post substantive review
Bajakajian
In Bajakajian,the Supreme Court held that requiring a defendant to forfeit $357,144 because he knowingly attempted
to leave the country without reporting the currency, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 982(a)(1), violates the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause.9 7 The Court reasoned that a
fine violates the Eighth Amendment if it is "grossly disproportional" to the defendant's offense.98 This holding creates a two-prong test. First, a court must determine whether
a monetary penalty qualifies as a "fine" within the meaning
of the Excessive Fines Clause. 9 The Court defines "fine" as
a payment to the government as "punishment" for an offense.1° Under the facts of Bajakajian, the Court found
that criminal in rei forfeiture is a "fine" within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment because it includes a scienter
requirement, serves no remedial purpose, and has historically been considered punitive."' Second, a court must determine whether a fine is "grossly disproportional" to the
defendant's wrong. 102 The Court has not articulated a clear
test for this determination; instead, it instructs lower courts
to weigh the amount of the fine against the gravity of the
defendant's offense, giving deference to Congress because
punishments are inherently imprecise.' 3
In Bajakajian,the Court cited several reasons for finding the forfeiture grossly disproportional: (1)the defendant's
crime was only a reporting offense;"° (2) it was unrelated
to other criminal activity; 05 (3) the defendant did not fit
into the class of people for whom the statute was principally designed;'06 (4) the harm the defendant caused the
government was negligible, as was the maximum criminal
sentence for the offense; 10 7 and (5) there was no articulable
correlation between the amount of the fine and any government injury. 08 These factors are not exhaustive; the
Excessive Fines Clause requires a case-by-case analysis.
Application to providers that submit numerous claims
Courts likely will extend Eighth Amendment protection to
health care providers facing enormous potential liability
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under the FCA. 09 In Halper,the Supreme Court evaluated
a prolific small gauge offender who had been sued under
the FCA and found that the monetary penalties imposed
were punitive, not remedial."0 The unanimous Court also
concluded that the sanctions were "overwhelmingly disproportional" to the government's losses and expenses, and
bore no rational relation to the goal of compensating the
government.' If courts find the logic in Halper persuasive, both prongs of the Bajakajian excessive fines test will
be satisfied. Courts will consider the FCA fines punitive as
applied to prolific small gauge offenders, and the fines imposed will be struck down as grossly disproportional. The
primary effect of this extension will be to make the per
offense charge permissive rather than mandatory. With
Bajakajian,judges now have the discretion to reduce fines
that overpunish prolific offenders.
This result is not automatic, however, because the Court
dismissed Halper'sanalysis as unworkable only six months
ago."' More likely, this dismissal can be explained by a
decision that the punitive versus remedial distinction is improper for double jeopardy analysis but acceptable for excessive fines analysis." 3 Certainly, prior to Halper, the
Double Jeopardy Clause had only been applied to criminal
sanctions, whereas the Supreme Court had never applied
the Excessive Fines Clause. As such, the Excessive Fines
Clause offered a relatively clean slate for interpretation and
provided a more logical constitutional hook to protect
against overwhelmingly disproportional government fines.
This explanation is supported by the close proximity in time
between the Court's statement that the concerns addressed
in Halpercould be addressed through other constitutional
provisions and Bajakajian,which applies the Excessive Fines
Clause for the first time, adopting analysis almost identical
4
to that used in Halper.
This theory is also supported by the manner in which
the Court disavowed Halper.Rather than stating that Halper
reached the wrong conclusions, the Court stated that Halper
began with the wrong inquiry."' The Court did not take
issue with the conclusions in Halper-thatthe FCA penalties imposed on prolific small gauge offenders were punitive and disproportional. 116 Instead, it argued that, under
proper double jeopardy analysis, Halpershould have asked
whether the FCA was criminal or civil on its face, rather
7
than whether the FCA was punitive or remedial as applied."
Even if courts do not look to Halper, they will likely
find that FCA penalties imposed on prolific small gauge
offenders in the health care industry violate the Excessive
Fines Clause. After all, the factors that the Court relied on
in Bajakajiansupport the classification of FCA penalties as
fines. First, the FCA has a scienter requirement, and the
conduct it penalizes is also a crime. Second, the FCA serves
a punitive purpose. In the case of many health care providers, the monetary penalty far exceeds the cost to the government of the false claim, even including the money spent

investigating and prosecuting the claim. Under Bajakajian,
a penalty that exceeds its remedial purpose serves a punitive purpose. Third, the FCA penalty is, at least in part,
historically punitive. In Bajakajian, the Court stated that
double indemnification had historically been viewed as a
complete remedy. If double indemnification fully compensates the government, treble damages accompanied by a
$5,000 to $10,000 per offense penalty must be historically
punitive, particularly when applied to prolific small gauge
offenders.
If the court determines that the FCA's application to
prolific offenders is punitive, then it must decide if the fines
imposed are grossly disproportional to the health care
provider's offense. This requires a fact-specific inquiry, and
the holding in Bajakajian only tells lower courts that they
should compare the amount of the fine with the gravity of
the offense. This standard allows considerable judicial discretion, making predicting the behavior of lower courts
more difficult.
Courts likely will find the fines imposed under the FCA
on prolific offenders grossly disproportional in many cases.
Courts are most apt to find the penalties unconstitutional
when false claims result from commonly misunderstood
Medicare regulations, when the government has acquiesced
to the provider's interpretation for years, when providers
relied on expert consultants or advice from administrators
at HCFA, or when providers did not intend to defraud the
government. Courts may also sympathize with providers
whose motives are suspect if they cost the government a
relatively small amount of money in relation to the enormous liability due to the large number of claims. Some courts
may never consider fines under the FCA grossly disproportional, because they view Medicare and Medicaid fraud as
such a serious offense. These courts will argue that defrauding the government is significantly worse than the reporting offense in Bajakajian, reasoning that the government
needs strong deterrent measures to control rampant health
care fraud.
Bajakajian leaves courts with enormous discretion to
weigh the seriousness of the offense against the size of the
fine. This discretion releases courts from the mandatory
per offense fine. Although ex post proportionality review
will not make the FCA directly tailored to culpability or
damages, it will allow recourse from the more egregious
cases of liability. If the current FCA cases are any indication, judges will welcome this freedom and use it to reduce
some fines imposed against providers. This protection
should empower more providers to challenge their cases in
court.
The impact of ex post proportionalityreview: a

lesson from punitive damages
Bajakajianoffers a new shield for health care providers. It
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does not provide the criminal procedural protections that
the FCA arguably requires, but it may provide a better safeguard against potential legislative and prosecutorial abuse
of power by reviewing substantive results. The benefits of
ex post proportionality review are obvious. This type of
case-by-case review allows courts to address the problem
of excessive liability directly. Unlike procedural protection,
which leaves judges powerless to alter the final results when
proper procedures produce irrational conclusions, proportionality review enables judges to ensure that the end result
is fair. Further, proportionality review is a more precise tool.
It enables judges to reduce a penalty to a reasonable amount
without having to bar it completely. Procedural protections
do not enable judges to adjust fines in this way.
Unfortunately, the disadvantages of ex post proportionality review are equally apparent. Substantive review tests
are very difficult for courts to administer. Bajakajian asks
judges to determine whether a fine is grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the defendant's offense, but the
concept of proportionality is very difficult to unpack."'
The Supreme Court directs judges to consider the proportionality of each fine in relation to the gravity of the offense, but there is little justification for the judiciary second-guessing a difficult legislative value judgment as to the
seriousness of an offense. Substantive reviews require courts
to exercise subjective judgments. Courts have difficulty performing such reviews in a fair and consistent manner, and
they seldom bring any special expertise to the process. Consequently, some legal scholars argue that there must be an
independent justification for why courts would resolve the
issue better than the legislature. 119 Otherwise, scholars argue, courts should not embark on substantive reviews.
The Supreme Court's struggle to articulate relatively
objective criteria for proportionality in BMW of North
America, Inc. v. Gore illustrates the problem.120 In BMW,
the Court overturned a punitive damages award for $2
million as excessive when actual damages were estimated at
$4,000.121 The Court argued that the Fourteenth Amendment's Substantive Due Process Clause prevented excessive
punitive damages.i The Court relied on three factors to
determine proportionality: (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the plaintiff's conduct; (2) the ratio of actual or potential harm to the award; and (3) the difference between
the punitive damages awarded and punishment under civil
or criminal statutes for similar misconduct.2 3 The Court
also stated that no one factor could be dispositive and that
other factors might sometimes come into play. Lower courts
have had a difficult time applying these ambiguous criteria
24
in a consistent manner.1
The ex post proportionality review used for punitive
damages closely parallels the Court's recently announced
ex post proportionality review of fines. This similarity is
not surprising because punitive damages and fines serve similar purposes. Both exceed proven remedial costs in part

because other damages seem likely to have occurred that
are too difficult to measure or prove and because suits are
not always prosecuted.'2 Thus, both large fines and punitive damages are required to deter bad behavior fully. Fines
and punitive damages also have an expressive and retributive purpose. i16 They reflect the community's consensus that
certain behavior merits punishment. The more egregious
the conduct, the larger the punishment should be.
Initially, however, the justification for monitoring punitive damages awards appears much stronger than the argument for reviewing fines. First, fines do not pose a notice
problem. They are significantly more predictable; a defined
conduct triggers a predetermined penalty. This makes planning possible. In contrast, punitive damages cannot be predicted. Jury behavior is notoriously erratic. 2 7 Two juries
hearing the same facts, finding the same level of culpability,
often award vastly different punitive damages.12 i This lack
of predictability makes it difficult for punitive damages to
deter sufficiently malign behavior without overdeterrence. 19
Second, fines do not suffer from the procedural weaknesses often attributed to punitive damages. Juries are often criticized for being influenced by prejudice and stereotypes. Fines are less arbitrary; a defined conduct triggers a
predetermined sanction. Therefore, similarly situated defendants are treated similarly. This uniform application decreases discrimination problems. It also prevents the unfairness that results from different juries awarding different
punitive damages for similar conduct. Further, it decreases
the likelihood that the relative skill, experience, and knowledge of the trial attorney will be a significant factor. 30
Fines are also more rational. Legislatures have the opportunity to consider fines rationally and fully because they
are set in advance. They can hear from interests groups,
poll constituents, or research the issues. Even after legislatures set a fine, they can always reconsider it later. In contrast, juries must make a decision on the spot that they cannot reevaluate. This pressure situation, where outside information, opinions, and research are forbidden, creates
more arbitrary, less reasoned results.
Moreover, the democratic process already monitors
fines. They do not need judicial monitoring because they
have a natural democratic check. The legislature sets fines,
and if citizens oppose these fines, they can lobby to change
them or elect new representatives who will. Juries have no
such check. They cannot be voted out because the majority
of the population thinks the wrong verdict was reached or
that damages were too high.
Finally, a judicial review of fines disturbs the balance of
power between the different branches of government. If
judges have the power to overturn on vague and arbitrary
grounds the legislative will on the proper punishment for
certain offenses, this may erode the legislature's power and
greatly strengthen the judiciary's. Such a shift in the balance of power could undermine the voice of the people
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because many judges are appointed (often for life), rather
than elected."' Reviewing punitive damages awards does
not cause this same problem. Jury awards are already part
of the judicial system, hence, the judicial branch is merely
monitoring its own proper functioning.
These arguments certainly present compelling reasons
for the claim that punitive damages pose dangers that fines
do not; but, ultimately, the unique danger that fines pose is
significant enough to merit judicial supervision. Fines, unlike punitive damages, are set by the legislature, which benefits from their collection. Conversely, juries are disinterested
parties. Initially, this factor may not seem overwhelming.
Legislators' behavior can be checked through the electoral
process, and fines cannot be politically motivated because
they apply equally to all. The Bill of Rights, however, explicitly protects citizens from any abuse of government
power in certain defined areas, among them is fines. 132The
Eighth Amendment expressly prohibits the government
from imposing excessive fines.'33 A clear, unstrained reading of it mandates that courts perform an ex post substantive review. 3 4 After all, an excessiveness inquiry intrinsically requires evaluating each fine under the particular circumstances."' Fines cannot be "excessive" on their
face,
13 6
but only in relation to the conduct they punish.
Is ex post proportionality review a better solution?
Proceduralprotectionsv. ex post proportionality
review
Criminal procedural protections and ex post proportionality review offer some protection to prolific small gauge offenders under the FCA, but both solutions are plagued with
administrative difficulties. Criminal procedural protections
have three main advantages. First, courts know what criminal procedural protections require. The parameters of the
right against self-incrimination and double jeopardy are
clearly defined. In contrast, even after courts determine that
a fine is excessive, they have no clear guidance as to how
much they should reduce the fine. 137 Thus, ex post proportionality review is likely to be inconsistent. Second, procedural protections can avoid unjust results without a caseby-case analysis. Proportionality review requires that the
facts of each case be considered, which necessarily demands
enormous judicial resources. Third, providing criminal procedural protections has the ancillary benefit of resolving
the insufficient procedural protections problem. Although
the end result, reducing excessive fines, is paramount, the
procedure is of importance, too. Ex post proportionality
review provides a more direct solution to the problem of
excessive fines, but it does not have the same spill-over effect-addressing double jeopardy and self-incrimination
problems which would be solved by criminal procedural
protections.

Despite these disadvantages, ex post proportionality
review seems to provides a better solution to excessive fines.
First, substantive review addresses the problem directly.
Criminal procedural protections often will not prevent excessive fines because procedural protections do not change
the mandatory nature of per offense penalties. Thus, multiple claim filers will face disproportionate fines under the
FCA even with procedural protections. In contrast, ex post
proportionality review changes the per offense penalty from
a mandatory to a presumptive fine. This allows judges latitude to reduce unfair fines.
Second, ex post proportionality review is a more precise tool. With substantive review, judges can reduce a fine
to prevent it from being grossly disproportional. This flexibility will not guarantee that all fines correspond directly
to culpability or damages, but it will facilitate closer matches.
Criminal procedural protections only permit judges to strike
a fine on procedural grounds.
Third, ex post proportionality review should be easier
to administer. Because only grossly disproportionate fines
will be reduced, some of the administrative difficulties of
Hudson can be avoided. It will not matter that most fines
contain at least some punitive element. Although this may
mean that most fines satisfy the first prong of the Bajakajian
test, only those fines bearing no rational relationship to the
gravity of the defendant's offense will be decreased.' 3' Thus,
ex post proportionality review does not open the floodgate
to review of all civil fines the way criminal procedural protections would. Further, because a substantive review allows the court only to reduce a fine, the court has more
room to apply a difficult standard. Criminal procedural
protections either apply or not.
Another proceduralalternative
Because criminal procedural protections are too difficult to
administer and offer at best a limited solution, and knowing that ex post proportionality review may also prove impossible to administer effectively, another ex ante procedural alternative should be considered. Courts could prohibit all fines that charge a penalty per each claim without
setting a ceiling on per claim penalties. 3 9 This alternative
has many advantages. First, it would solve the proportionality problem under the FCA without being as difficult to
administer. A blanket rule, it provides clear guidance to
lower courts as to which penalties are constitutionally prohibited. Barring unrestrained per claim penalties would also
allow courts to examine statutes ex ante on their face. This
ex ante review would greatly decrease inconsistencies between courts and would cost less to administer.
Further, although judges are poorly equipped to second guess legislative intent regarding the severity of sanctions required to deter malign behavior, judges are better
qualified to determine when a fine structure will produce
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irrational results. A per offense fine structure obscures the
fine's application. This characteristic makes it difficult for
legislatures to foresee the unjust results the fine may produce. Thus, the judiciary is more justified in questioning
the legislative judgment in these cases.
Unfortunately, prohibiting unrestrained per offense
charges also has some significant drawbacks. Striking all
fines that charge a penalty per offense without setting a

ceiling is both over- and underinclusive. The solution is overinclusive because it will overturn numerous fines that may
never be applied in unconstitutional ways. As the Court
stressed in Halperand Bajakajian,grossly disproportionate
results only occur in rare cases. 40 The solution is underinclusive because it does not capture cases in which the ceiling would be a disproportionate fine or the fine is excessive
but did not result from a per offense charge.
This solution also appears somewhat arbitrary because
it does not link directly to any text in the Constitution.
Arguably, it could be required on Substantive Due Process
grounds, but it certainly does not have the textual justification that a substantive review of excessive fines enjoys. Given
the extent to which this prohibition would encroach on
legislative statute writing, a stronger textual justification in
the Constitution may be required.
Finally, although eliminating unrestrained per offense
charges may be easier to administer because it operates ex
ante, it presents unique administrative difficulties. First, the
proper ceiling itself is a subjective judgment. If courts set
the appropriate ceiling, this encroaches on the legislature's
right to determine civil penalties. Besides, judges have no
particular expertise in determining appropriate ceilings and
are not as responsive to the electorate. Setting a ceiling is
far too subjective and fact-intensive an inquiry for courts to
excel at it. On the other hand, if the legislature sets the
ceilings, it may set them so high that the resulting fines are
still excessive in many cases. Thus, the demands of the Eighth
Amendment would not be met. Worse still, a fair ceiling,
without more nuanced liability guidelines, may not exist. It
is difficult to imagine a ceiling that would capture the full
costs to the government in all cases without setting the ceiling so high that it allows people to be grossly overpenalized
in some circumstances.
Second, effectively eliminating per offense charges requires defining what constitutes a single offense, unless all
blanket charges are disallowed. The difficulties defining a
given offense are well illustrated by the definition problems
in criminal law. It is often difficult for a judge to distinguish
offenses from one another, and there is no obvious way to
decide when it is slicing too thin. All blanket charges cannot be struck, however, because damages alone do notpunish behavior. Sometimes actual damages will be small, but
culpability will be great. Statutes must be able to deter misbehavior even when it does not result in provable economic
damages. Besides, so many statutes currently contain blan-

ket damages that prohibiting such damages would require
rewriting half of the civil code.
Given the over- and underinclusive nature of this solution, its failure to conform closely to the text of the Eighth
Amendment, and the administrative difficulties, the Court
seems best advised to pursue its current course. Despite the
challenges of administering ex post substantive standards,
the Constitution seems to demand this type of case-by-case
review. The high "grossly disproportional" standard could
create a workable judicial doctrine that prevents excessive
liability but constrains courts from interfering with most
fines. If it does not, limiting per offense charges may be the
next best solution.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court's latest attempt to control excessive
fines is its best effort yet. Bajakajian gives meaning to the
Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause and provides
protection to defendants when the legislature abuses its discretion. Despite administrative difficulties determining when
a fine becomes excessive, ex post proportionality review
offers the best hope for constraining congressional fines in
a constitutionally acceptable manner. Procedural protections simply cannot solve this substantive problem as well.
Courts may vary in their application of the Bajakajiantest,
but the fact that judges may only reduce, not eliminate,
excessive fines limits the damages from inconsistent application. Similarly, the fact that only grossly disproportionate fines will be altered constrains the cases that courts will
consider and provides at least some deference for legislative
judgment. In the end, health care providers benefit from the
FCNs per offense charge becoming presumptive rather than
mandatory, even if courts apply the standard imperfectly.
Activating the Excessive Fines Clause will not resolve
all provider complaints with the FCA or the government's
enforcement initiatives. It may, however, offer providers a
shield against unjust applications of the FCA. Perhaps, this
constitutional protection will embolden more providers to
fight their cases in court when they believe that they are the
victims of overzealous, inappropriate prosecutions. If nothing more, the Excessive Fines Clause can be used as a bargaining chip in settlement discussions for the nearly 3,500
civil cases currently pending. 141 Whatever the ultimate impact, in a system of checks and balances, it is important for
the court to monitor and curb potential injustices created
by the legislative and executive branches. Ex post substantive review of fines can accomplish this.
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